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Abstract
This paper studies moral hazard in banking due to delegated mon-
itoring in an environment of aggregate risk and examines its implica-
tions for credit market equilibrium and regulation, in a model where
banks are price competitors for loans and deposits. It provides a ra-
tionale for an incentive-based lending capacity positively linked to the
bank’s capital and profit margin, for an oligopolistic market struc-
ture wherever banks have market power, and for capital requirements.
Social-welfare-maximizing capital requirements are lowered in reces-
sions, are higher the more fragmented the banking sector, and are in-
creased when anti-competitive measures are removed. In equilibrium
banks earn excessive profits and credit may be rationed.
JEL-Classification: D82, G28, L13
Keywords: bank-moral hazard, capital requirements, competition
∗I am grateful to John Moore for his help since the early stage of this project. For their
helpful comments, I thank Sudipto Bhattacharya, Vincenzo Denicolo’, and Bruno Parigi.
Financial support by CNR and MURST 40% is acknowledged.
†Aﬃliation: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126 Bologna.
Tel. +051-2098154; fax: +051-2098040; e-mail: gchiesa@economia.unibo.it
1
1 Introduction
Since the removal of regulatory restrictions on branching, deposit rates,
scope of business and so on in the late seventies and early eighties in order
to facilitate increased interbank competition, there has been a general move
towards re-regulation of banking on a prudential basis, primarily capital
requirements. Interestingly, this general trend has been interrupted only
during recessions when regulators have been more lenient, justifying this
approach on the grounds that capital requirements should be indexed to
the business cycle (see Tirole 1994). There is a suggestion that perhaps
such leniency may have undesirable consequences, based on recent empirical
evidence that suggests that financial market liberalization may contribute
to bank crises (see Demirguc-Kunt and Detrajache 1998).
These developments raise the following important questions. Should
prudential regulation be related to the intensity of banking competition
(market structure)? Should it be linked to the business cycle, with regulators
acting more leniently during recessions? And, more fundamentally, what
determines the intensity of banking competition, and should the banking
system be regulated at all?
Three strands of the literature try to clarify these policy issues and to
provide arguments in support of policy makers’ attitude. One strand focuses
on whether capital requirements are an eﬀective tool for limiting the risk
on an asset portfolio whose return is taken as exogenously given in a partial
equilibrium framework (Sharpe 1978; Karaken andWallace 1978; Kohen and
Santomero 1980; Bhattacharya 1982; Furlong and Keeley 1989; Keeley and
Furlong 1990; Rochet 1992). The basic insight is that capital requirements
on banks attenuate moral hazard, reducing banks’ incentive to take excessive
risk.1 A second strand analyzes the macroeconomic implications of capital
requirements, showing that they may reinforce macroeconomic fluctuations
(see Blum and Hellwig 1995; Thakor 1996). Implicitly, this provides an
argument for linking capital requirements to the business cycle. However,
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these models do not explain why capital requirements are there in the first
place, or what the costs of lifting them might be. A third strand notes
that bank rents act as a mitigating factor against risk-taking by making
it more costly for a bank to fail (Bhattacharya 1982; Chan, Greenbaum
and Thakor 1992; Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz 2000).2 This suggests that
capital requirements and profits can be viewed as substitutes in controlling
moral hazard in banking.
The implicit assumption underlying all three strands is that fully diver-
sified asset portfolios are not feasible. Indeed, according to a fourth strand,
delegated-monitoring theory (Diamond 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor
1984; Diamond 1991; Hellwig 1991; Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993), the
construction of a fully diversified portfolio whose return is certain eliminates
moral hazard entirely and with it, all need for regulation (see Diamond 1984;
Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). To reintroduce moral hazard, Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997) exclude diversification by allowing for aggregate risk — project
returns are correlated. This creates an incentive for banks to take bad risk
and provides a role for bank capital in attenuating moral hazard.
From these four strands of literature we learn that systematic risk may
lead to moral hazard and that capital requirements and profits play a role in
controlling it, although the former may be harmfully pro-cyclical. But we do
not learn why the banking system should be regulated at all as opposed to
being disciplined by market forces, or how regulation should be designed in
terms of its relationship to interbank competition and the business cycle. To
address these unanswered questions, this paper develops a model in which
the intensity of competition, the role of capital requirements, and bank
profits are all endogenously determined. Moreover, the eﬀects of the business
cycle, of banking-sector concentration and of structural regulation (entry
barriers and market liberalization) on all these variables are analyzed.
A bank acts as a delegated monitor in an environment of aggregate risk;
that is, project returns are correlated as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).3
Banks borrow from investors and lend to firms, monitoring them in equilib-
rium, at terms that result from interbank price competition.4 They act on
behalf of shareholders (insiders) whose equity holdings constitute the bank’s
capital; additional inside capital is too costly to raise (see Smith 1986 for a
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survey of evidence).
The essential ingredient of the model is moral hazard in banking: insiders
may gain by financing privately profitable projects that have negative social
value. Indeed, bank monitoring costs can be interpreted as the opportunity
costs to insiders of not engaging in insider lending, or colluding with bor-
rowers to undertake high-risk, high-return projects or, more generally, those
bringing private benefits. The results are as follows. In equilibrium, banks
engage in monitoring: the amount of lending that a bank undertakes is sub-
ject to a ceiling – the bank’s incentive-based lending capacity – that is
positively related to its capital and its endogenous profit margin (the spread
between lending and borrowing rates). A corollary is that even if banks com-
pete in prices and there is no product diﬀerentiation, bank competition is
imperfect: competition for loans is Bertrand-Edgeworth with capacity con-
straints, the constraints resulting from incentive problems. The incentive-
based lending capacity exceeds the bank’s capital, i.e. there is scope for
outside financing and hence for financial intermediation. However, in the
absence of regulation (by market discipline) there is a no-intermediation
equilibrium, unless investors act in coordinated fashion and banks’ profit
margins are public information. By contrast, under the same informational
constraints, optimal capital requirements permit an intermediation equi-
librium in which banks raise outside financing and lend in excess of their
capital. Thus, capital requirements are a solution not only to the lack of co-
ordination among dispersed investors but also to the unobservability of such
important features as contractual terms with borrowers, and hence profit
margins. Capital requirements work by limiting banks’ scale of business.
They restrict the bank’s lending not to exceed its incentive-based lending
capacity, in order to retain the bank’s incentive to monitor. Rational, albeit
unprotected, investors are then willing to fund banks. The equilibrium val-
ues of optimal capital requirements and banks’ profit margins are inversely
related. Social-welfare-maximizing capital requirements are related to the
business cycle, via the link between recession, insolvencies and bank capital,
and regulators act more leniently during recessions. Capital requirements
are raised when entry barriers are removed and are lower the more concen-
trated is the banking sector. In other words, they depend on the intensity
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of banking competition. Finally, the equilibrium is a constrained optimum;
it diﬀers from the first-best in that banks earn excessive profits and credit
may be rationed. Our analysis therefore complements Winton (1995) and
Yanelle (1997), who reject perfect competition in Diamond’s (1984) environ-
ment of costly observability of project returns, where portfolio diversifica-
tion reduces monitoring (auditing) costs but introduces increasing returns
to scale.5 Winton (1995) allows for a finite economy where diversification
is limited. He shows that bank capitalization replaces or complements di-
versification in reducing default probability and therefore lowering auditing
costs, and that the equilibrium banking sector may have several banks. In
this paper, project returns are observable at no cost, but there is bank moral
hazard. Capitalization and profits jointly determine the bank’s risk choice,
and, in equilibrium, several banks are active, but capital regulation may be
essential to the viability of intermediation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 derives the bank’s incentive-based lending capacity and
characterizes the distortions that motivate capital requirements. Section
4 derives social-welfare-maximizing bank-capital regulation and the credit-
market equilibrium (borrowing and lending rates and lending volumes) as
a function of structural parameters (aggregate bank capital, aggregate loan
demand, number of banks). Section 5 delineates the empirical implications
of the model, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a one-period credit market consisting of total measureM of non-
atomistic entrepreneurs or firms, total measure I of non-atomistic investors,
and n banks (indexed by i = 1,2..n), with n ≥ 2. Agents are risk-neutral,
have limited liability, and maximize their end-of-period expected wealth.
Each entrepreneur can undertake an investment project that requires one
unit of resources. Each investor is endowed with one unit of resources, which
can either be stored at the gross return Rd or deposited in a bank. Investors
are large in number (I > M). A bank takes deposits from investors and lends
to entrepreneurs. It acts on behalf of its shareholders, insiders, whose equity
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holdings constitute the bank’s endowment of inside capital. This capital can
be either lent to entrepreneurs or stored at the gross rate Rd. Banks are
endowed with aggregate capital A > 0 that is distributed symmetrically
across banks. Thus, An is an index of concentration of the banking sector.
2.1 Project Technology and Monitoring
Bank lending is in the form of project financing. A project requires one unit
of resources at the beginning of the period and delivers a random return at
the end. The realization of this return depends on the macro-state realiza-
tion at the end of period θ ∈
©
θ, θ
ª
, where θ occurs with probability p, and
on the project type. A good project (type g ) delivers a return of x both
in the good state θ and in the bad state θ ; a bad project (type b) delivers
a return of x in θ and of zero in θ . Returns are observable and verifiable.
Whether a bank-funded project is of type g depends on the bank’s choice
of action at the beginning of period a ∈ {m,∅}, where m indicates ”moni-
tor”, and ∅ ”not monitor”: a monitored project is type g, i.e. it succeeds
whatever the macro-state realization; an unmonitored project is type b, i.e.
it succeeds only in the favorable macro-state realization θ.
Monitoring may consist in the provision of services tailored to the firm,
or a constraint on the entrepreneur’s choice of project through appropriate
debt covenants, whose fulfillment is then monitored. This would be the
case if a type b project oﬀered private benefits large enough to lead the
entrepreneur to prefer the bad project. In this case non-monitoring, i.e. ∅,
implies that the entrepreneur will undertake the type b project.6
Bank monitoring costs F > 0 per project. This is a non-pecuniary eﬀort
cost to the bank. F may also be interpreted as the opportunity cost of
eschewing insider lending, forgoing the potential private benefits of a type b
project in collusion with the borrower.
Assumption A1
(an unmonitored project has negative net present value:)
px < Rd (1)
Assumption A2
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(a monitored project has positive net present value:)
x > Rd + F (2)
Assumption A3
The bank’s choice of action is unobservable.
Our assumptions imply that: (i) bank monitoring increases loan value
and is unobservable to outsiders and costly to the bank; (ii) the average
loan return, conditional upon non-monitoring, is uncertain (its realization
depends on the macro-state realization). The first assumption is a necessary
condition for a problem of delegation or bank moral hazard vis-a-vis out-
siders (investors); the second assumption ensures that this problem cannot
be solved through diversification.
In our framework, a bank’s outside equity and debt are perfectly equiva-
lent. The relevant diﬀerence is between outside and inside financing, where
the latter is bounded by An . We assume that outside financing is in the form
of deposits.
2.2 The Credit Game
The game proceeds as follows.
At date 0, the social-welfare-maximizing regulator publicly announces
banks’ capital requirements. This is the regulation stage. At date 1, each
bank i = 1, 2....n oﬀers a gross rate Ri at which it is willing to lend and a
gross rate Rdi at which it is willing to borrow. This is the bank competi-
tion stage. Finally, at date 2, banks choose whether to monitor their loan
portfolios.7 This is the monitoring stage.8 Figure 1 summarizes this sequence
of events.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The outcome of the bank competition stage determines: i’s lending rate,
Ri; the deposit rate, Rdi; the volume of lending, Li; and deposits, Di, where
Li satisfies i’s flow of funds constraint, Li ≤ Di + An .
As usual, the game is solved backwards. We provide below, as a bench-
mark, the first best solution obtained in the absence of any delegation prob-
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lem, i.e. if banks’ choices of action were observable and contractible or,
equivalently, if banks had unlimited liability.
2.3 First Best
Let R∗ denote the lending rate that makes it possible to recoup, in expected
value, the resources invested in a monitored project:
R∗ ≡ Rd + F (3)
Proposition 1 If the bank’s choice of action were contractible, then: (i)
the eﬃcient lending level M would be obtained; (ii) all lending would be
monitored, and; (iii) all firms would borrow at R∗.
This follows simply, because if the action is contractible, then the rate
oﬀered to depositors, Rdi, is set contingent on the action. This is suﬃcient
to ensure that banks internalize the consequences of their choices, i.e. that a
bank maximizes its expected profits through monitoring. In the market for
loans, banks are pure Bertrand competitors, with each earning zero expected
profits in equilibrium.
3 Incentive-Based Lending Capacity and the So-
cial Costs of Market Discipline
We now turn to the case in which the bank’s action is unobservable. The
credit-portfolio outcome depends on overall economic performance: banks
may be tempted to bet that macroeconomic factors will support the per-
formance of firms (that the macro-state realization will be the good one
θ), thus avoiding costly monitoring and passing the resulting losses on to
depositors. In this section we focus on the monitoring stage and derive
the bank’s monitoring incentive constraint. As a consequence, we obtain
conditions on banks’ borrowing and lending rates and lending volumes that
must necessarily hold in equilibrium. The key result is that the bank finds
it profitable to monitor if and only if its lending volume does not exceed a
critical value; this incentive-based lending capacity is positively related to
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its capital and profit margin. In contrast to Section 2, interbank compe-
tition is now imperfect: competition for loans is Bertrand-Edgeworth with
capacity constraints. We derive the informational constraints necessary to
allow intermediation under market discipline, and provide a rationale for
regulation imposing capital requirements on banks.
3.1 Incentive-Based Lending Capacity
By assumptions A1-A2, an unmonitored project has negative net present
value and a monitored one, positive. Since in equilibrium agents cannot
be worse oﬀ than with their status-quo payoﬀs, we immediately obtain the
following result.
Proposition 2 In any equilibrium, all banks monitor.
That is, projects that are financed have positive net present value. A
corollary to Proposition 2 is that i’s lending rate, Ri, satisfies:
x ≥ Ri ≥ R∗ . (4)
This means that Ri allows the bank to recoup, in expected value, the over-
all cost of the resources invested in a monitored project. To simplify, we
henceforth restrict i’s lending-rate strategies Ri to the interval (4) .
Proposition 3 below derives i’s equilibrium strategy at the monitoring
stage. The key observations are that banks have limited liability and that
a monitored lending portfolio performs better than an unmonitored one in
the bad macro-state θ. Therefore:
(i) If i’s profit-maximizing choice is to monitor (that is, if a∗i = m),
then i is solvent with probability one and Rdi = Rd satisfies the depositors’
participation constraint. Let Rdi = Rd. Then i’s expected profit, conditional
upon monitoring being the profit-maximizing choice, is:
π(Ri, Li|a∗i = m) = [RiLi −Rd(Li − An )]− FLi − AnRd
= [Ri − (Rd + F )]Li ;
(5)
This is non-negative (by Ri ≥ R∗);
(ii) If i’s profit-maximizing choice is not to monitor (that is, if a∗i = ∅),
then it is necessarily the case that its lending volume is suﬃciently large
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with respect to capital to ensure that i is insolvent in θ (if it were solvent
then it would suﬀer all the consequences of financing projects with negative
net present value, and its profit-maximizing choice would necessarily be to
monitor, by assumptions A1-A2 and Ri ≥ R∗). Hence, if a∗i = ∅, then i is
solvent only if the macro-state realization is good
¡
θ
¢
, when loans perform
well regardless of whether they are monitored. In state θ, i loses its capital,
so its expected profit is:9
π(Ri, Li|a∗i = ∅) = p[RiLi −Rd(Li −
A
n
)]− A
n
Rd . (6)
Thus, i’s profit-maximizing choice is to monitor if and only if:
π(Ri, Li|a∗i = m) ≥ π(Ri, Li|a∗i = ∅) (7)
that is, iﬀ:
A
n
Li
≥ 1 + F
(1− p)Rd
− Ri
Rd
(8)
In summary, the bank monitors if and only if the amount of capital that
it invests per lending unit, i.e.
A
n
Li
, does not fall below the threshold level
c(Ri, Rd):
c(Ri, Rd) ≡ 1 +
F
(1− p)Rd
− Ri
Rd
. (9)
Note that c(Ri, Rd) is decreasing in the lending rate Ri and increasing
in the cost of funding Rd (by x ≥ Ri ≥ R∗and assumption A1). Thus, the
higher i’s profit margin, [Ri − (Rd + F )] , the greater the amount of lending
Li that it can do for any given capital level without violating the incentive
to monitor. Moreover, c(Ri, Rd) < 1 (by Ri ≥ R∗, and assumptions A1-A2).
Therefore, if the monitoring-incentive constraint (8) fails to hold, the bank
has necessarily over-loaned its capital.10
The foregoing can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let bank i’s lending rate satisfy inequality (4) , and its bor-
rowing rate be Rdi = Rd. Then if lending volume satisfies:
A
n
Li
≥ c(Ri, Rd) , (10)
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its profit-maximizing choice is to monitor, it is solvent with probability one,
its expected profit is non-negative, and the depositors’ participation con-
straint is satisfied. By contrast, if Li violates inequality (10), then for any
Ri and Rdi ≥ Rd bank i earning non-negative expected profit would necessar-
ily imply that its profit-maximizing choice is not to monitor, and depositors
suﬀer expected losses.
If Li violates condition (10) , then for Rdi = Rd bank i will not monitor
(by the incentive constraint (8)), but then it would not monitor for any
Rdi ≥ Rd (that is, for any borrowing rate that could possibly satisfy the
depositors’ participation constraint). Indeed, the higher the cost of funding,
the lower the marginal return to monitoring. Unmonitored projects have
negative net present value, and bank i’s expected profit is non-negative; this
is obviously true, since otherwise at the competition stage the bank would
have refrained from lending. Consequently, any losses fall on the bank’s
depositors, so that if Li were high enough to violate condition (10) , then
depositors would necessarily suﬀer expected losses.
Define:
Lc
µ
Ri, Rd;
A
n
¶
≡
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
A
n
c(Ri,Rd)
, if c(Ri, Rd) > 0
∞ , if c(Ri, Rd) ≤ 0
(11)
For Li = Lc( ) condition (10) is satisfied at equality, and Lc
¡
Ri, Rd; An
¢
is
thus the maximum amount of lending at which i finds it incentive-compatible
to monitor. In what follows we call Lc
¡
Ri, Rd; An
¢
the incentive-based lend-
ing capacity of i, and c(Ri, Rd) i’s minimum incentive-based capital require-
ment. The larger is i’s profit margin, RiRd , the lower the requirement and the
greater the incentive-based lending capacity for any given level of capital.
In equilibrium agents’ participation constraints are necessarily satisfied,
and this is possible only if the bank’s profit-maximizing choice is to monitor
(by Proposition 2). Moreover, the depositors’ participation constraint holds
at equality, because loanable funds are in excess supply. By Propositions 2
and 3 it follows that in equilibrium, i’s lending volume satisfies inequality
(10), its lending rate satisfies inequality (4), its expected profit is given by
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(5), and its unit cost of funding is Rdi = Rd (i.e. the depositors’ participation
constraint holds at equality). In view of Proposition 3, we henceforth set
Rdi = Rd, ∀i.
3.2 The Properties of an Equilibrium and the Social Costs
of Market Discipline
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, bank competition for loans is restrained.
This follows because the amount of lending that a bank can undertake
is limited by (10). Competition for loans is Bertrand-Edgeworth with ca-
pacity constraints; this is formally analyzed in the following section. These
constraints do not depend on technological factors, as in the industrial or-
ganization literature, but are on incentive problems.
We noted that the minimum (incentive-based) capital requirement, c(Ri, Rd),
is less than one. We thus have the following result.
Corollary 2 The maximum amount of lending that a bank can undertake
without violating its incentive-compatibility condition to monitor is greater
than its capital. Hence, there is scope for financial intermediation.
But will there be financial intermediation in an unregulated economy?
In other words, will depositors be willing to fund unregulated banks?
Corollary 3 In the absence of regulation (by market discipline), depositors
will fund the bank only if all the determinants of the bank’s incentive-based
lending capacity are public information and individual depositors coordinate
their decisions to extend funds to the bank.
Depositors anticipate that the bank will monitor only if its lending vol-
ume does not exceed its incentive-based capacity (by Proposition 3). In the
absence of regulatory limits, the only constraint on bank lending is given
by the amount of its loanable funds. Depositors will then be willing to
fund a bank only if they can force the bank’s loanable funds not to exceed
its incentive-based capacity. Intermediation can then obtain only if: (i)
bank lending capacities are observable, which requires banks’ profit mar-
gins to be public information, and; (ii) (dispersed) depositors coordinate
12
their decisions so as to eﬀectively constrain bank deposits, Di, to satisfy Di
+An ≤ Lc
¡
Ri, Rd; An
¢
.11
If the contractual terms between banks and borrowers (and hence banks’
profit margins) are not public information, then depositors will not fund
banks and there will be a no-intermediation equilibrium. We consequently
conclude that an unregulated economy may be characterized by underin-
vestment.
4 Competition and the Optimal Regulation of Bank
Capital
If market discipline fails to produce an intermediation equilibrium in which
depositors fund banks, the question is: Can (social-welfare-maximizing)
bank regulation lead to financial intermediation and dominate market dis-
cipline? If so, how should such regulation be designed?
These are the questions addressed in this section. Solving for an equi-
librium of the regulation game, we find that: (i) in contrast with the case of
market discipline (Corollary 3), banks are subject to capital requirements
and lend in excess of their capital, even if the contractual terms with borrow-
ers are not observable to depositors and regulators; (ii) capital requirements
increase when aggregate bank capital and/or the number of banks increases
relative to the aggregate demand for lending and banking competition is
more intense; (iii) the equilibrium is a constrained optimum. It diﬀers from
the first-best in that banks earn excessive profits and credit may be rationed.
We shall now derive these results in formal terms. We assume that con-
tractual terms between the bank and its borrowers (namely, the lending
rates Ri) are either unobservable or too costly to observe. Thus a bank’s
capital requirement cannot be conditioned on its profit margin; so the regu-
lator sets an unconditional capital requirement c, and each bank i = 1, ...n
cannot lend in excess of
A
n
c , i.e.:
Li ≤
A
n
c
, i = 1, 2.....n .
This allows us not only to derive an explicit credit-market-equilibrium so-
lution, but also to extract clear-cut predictions on unconditional capital
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requirements that are consistent with what is actually observed.
An unmonitored project has negative net present value, and a monitored
one, positive. To maximize social welfare, therefore, the projects that are
undertaken must be monitored. By Proposition 3, it follows that the optimal
capital requirement, denoted by c∗, necessarily satisfies bank monitoring
incentive constraints:
c∗ ≥ c(Ri, Rd), i = 1, 2....n ,
where c(Ri, Rd) is i0s minimum (incentive-based) capital requirement as
given by (9) ; i0s lending rate Ri is the outcome of lending competition
at date 1, given structural parameters and the capital requirement set at
date 0.
Under our simplifying assumption of rectangular demand for loans, max-
imizing social welfare is tantamount to maximizing the measure of projects
undertaken or, equivalently, aggregate lending, subject to bank monitoring
incentive constraints:
max
c
nX
i=1
Li (12)
s.t.
nP
i=1
Li = min(M, Ac )
c ≥ c(Ri, Rd), i = 1, 2....n
where Ac is the overall amount of lending that banks can undertake given the
capital requirement c, andM is the total measure of projects, or equivalently
the aggregate demand for loans. However, we wish our results to apply, at
least qualitatively, to the more general case of downward-sloping aggregate
demand for lending.12 We thus assume that the regulator’s objective is to
maximize the expected surplus of real investment activity that accrues to
firms, or equivalently to minimize bank rents subject to bank monitoring
incentive constraints. The regulator’s problem then amounts to choosing c
so as to maximize the overall lending that banks can undertake, subject to
bank monitoring incentive constraints:
max
c
A
c
(13)
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s.t.
c ≥ c(Ri, Rd), i = 1, 2....n (14)
Note that the optimal c that solves problem (13) is a solution to the problem
of social-welfare maximization (12); this c is the lowest within the interval
of values that maximize social welfare. Solving problem (13) amounts to
minimizing the capital requirement c subject to the constraint that each
bank i = 1, ...n finds it incentive-compatible to monitor (condition (14)).
Indeed, the lower the capital requirement, the greater the amount of lending
that banks can undertake, the more intense the competition in lending, the
lower the lending rates and hence the higher is the expected surplus of
real investment activity that accrues to firms, provided that c satisfies the
incentive constraint (14) . But if c violated inequality (14), then regulation
would fail to constrain lending not to exceed the bank’s incentive-based
capacity: in equilibrium depositors would not fund banks (by Proposition 3
and its Corollary 3).
4.1 Optimal Capital Requirement and Credit Market Equi-
librium
We solve for an equilibrium of competition in lending and for the optimal c.
This is the lowest c that satisfies inequality (14), given that depositors, who
learn c from the regulator’s public announcement at date 0, correctly infer
that the incentive constraint (14) is satisfied and that banks will monitor.
Given this rational inference, depositors are willing to fund banks, and banks
remunerate deposits at the rate Rd (by Proposition 3).
Structural parameters, A,n, andM , and the capital requirement c jointly
determine the lending competition regime, which depends on which of the
following mutually exclusive conditions is satisfied:
n
A
n
c
≤M (15)
(n− 1)
A
n
c
≥M (16)
M
n− 1 >
A
n
c
>
M
n
(17)
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If inequality (15) holds, then the overall amount of lending that banks
can undertake does not exceed aggregate demand, and the equilibrium strat-
egy of a bank is to oﬀer the monopoly rate x. By contrast, if inequality (16)
holds, then a bank’s competitors can cover the whole market, competition in
lending is unrestricted, and in equilibrium the expected profits of banks are
driven to zero. If neither condition (15) nor (16) holds, that is if A,n, M ,
and c satisfy inequality (17), then there is no equilibrium in pure strategies,
for the same reasons as in the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth model (Tirole
1988, Chapt.5, and the literature there cited). 13
The optimal capital requirement satisfies the incentive constraint (14),
and i’s lending rate, Ri, satisfies inequality (4). That is R∗ ≤ Ri ≤ x, ∀i
and banks’ expected profits are non-negative. Thus, the optimal capital
requirement, c∗, necessarily satisfies:
c ≥ c∗ ≥ c (18)
c ≡ c(R∗, Rd) = 1 +
F
(1− p)Rd
− R
∗
Rd
c ≡ c(x,Rd) = 1 +
F
(1− p)Rd
− x
Rd
where: 1 > c > c (by assumptions A1-A2).
Suppose that the minimum value of the capital requirement, c, satisfies
inequality (15), which is true if and only if:
A
M
≤ c (19)
then for c = c banks compete according to the (collusive) regime defined by
condition (15).
Lemma 1 If condition (19) holds, i.e. if aggregate bank capital is suﬃ-
ciently scarce, then:
c∗ = c ≡ c(x,Rd) (20)
and credit is rationed if inequality (19) is strict.
Proof. See Appendix.
If aggregate bank capital is scarce (i.e., if condition (19) is satisfied),
then the optimal capital requirement c∗ attains its minimum c. The total
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amount of lending that banks can undertake does not exceed aggregate de-
mand (because A, M and c = c∗ satisfy inequality (15)), banks implicitly
collude on the monopoly lending rate and undertake the maximum incentive-
compatible volume of lending:X
Li = nL
c(x,Rd;
A
n
) (21)
If inequality (19) is strict, this falls below aggregate demand, M .
Suppose that the maximum capital requirement, c, satisfies inequality
(16), which is true if and only if:
A
M
≥ c
µ
n
n− 1
¶
(22)
then for c = c, banks compete according to the (perfect) competition regime
defined by condition (16).
Lemma 2 If condition (22) holds, i.e. if aggregate bank capital is suﬃ-
ciently abundant, then:
c∗ = c ≡ c(R∗, Rd) (23)
and the first-best optimum is attained.
Proof. See Appendix.
If aggregate bank capital is suﬃciently abundant (i.e., if condition (22)
is satisfied), then the optimal capital requirement c∗attains its maximum c,
and A,M,n and c = c∗ satisfy inequality (16), so that a bank’s competitors
can cover the whole market. Competition in lending is so intense that rates
are driven to the zero-profit value R∗, and since no bank’s lending exceeds
its incentive-based capacity, all banks monitor. The equilibrium attained is
the first-best optimum.
It is worth remarking that as n increases, condition (22) weakens; that
is, the larger the number of competing banks, the more likely an equilibrium
where banks lend at the zero-profit rate and the capital requirement attains
its peak value c.
If neither condition (19) nor (22) holds, i.e. if :
c <
A
M
< c
µ
n
n− 1
¶
, (24)
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then at c∗ neither condition (15) nor (16) holds. When inequality (24) holds,
namely for intermediate values of aggregate bank capital, the competition
regime is that defined by condition (17): in equilibrium banks will use mixed
lending-rate strategies. Lemma 3 below derives c∗ for A ,n and M that
satisfy inequality (24). The key to the lemma is as follows.
(i) Assume condition (17) is satisfied. Then, as we prove below (Proof of
Lemma 3), each bank i = 1, ...n randomizes its lending rate according to an
atomless distribution function, µ, with support
£
R , R
¤
, where R denotes
the lower bound, and R the upper bound. Let the capital requirement, c,
satisfy:
c ≥ c(R ,Rd) . (25)
Then, because the lending rate realization of each bank i = 1, ...n satisfies
R ≤ Ri ≤ R, the incentive constraint (14) is met. Therefore, a∗i = m,
i = 1, ...n, and all banks monitor.
All rates in the support of µ yield the same (maximal) payoﬀ, denoted
by π . The distribution µ, R , R and π are the solution to:
[Ri − (Rd + F )]
("
M − (n− 1)
A
n
c
#
(µ (Ri))
n−1 +
A
n
c
h
1− (µ (Ri))n−1
i)
= π
(26)
R = argmax
Ri≤x
[Ri − (Rd + F )]
"
M − (n− 1)
A
n
c
#
(27)
µ (R) = 0 (28)
µ
¡
R
¢
= 1 (29)
The left-hand side of functional equation (26) gives i’s expected profit
at any lending rate Ri ∈
£
R , R
¤
, given that: a) its competitors randomize
their lending rates according to distribution µ with support
£
R , R
¤
; b) it
monitors lending, that is a∗i = m (which holds by (25)), and remunerates
depositors at Rd. Indeed, the expression [Ri − (Rd + F )] is i’s profit per unit
of lending conditional upon a∗i = m and its unit cost of funding being Rd (by
(5)). The expression in curly brackets gives i’s expected lending volume: if i
is the bank with the highest lending rate, then it faces the residual demand
for lending,M−(n− 1)
A
n
c , and the capital requirement is not binding; that
is, it lendsM−(n− 1)
A
n
c (by (17)); this occurs with probability (µ (Ri))
n−1.
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In any other event, the capital requirement is binding; that is, i’s lending
volume is
A
n
c (by (17)). The right-hand side of equation (27) is the monopoly
rate on the residual demand left to a bank when all the rivals undercut its
rate. Because a bank that sets its rate to the upper bound of the support
is undercut by all the rivals, the highest rate ever charged in equilibrium is
R given by (27) . Clearly R = x, the monopoly rate given the rectangular
demand curve.
Solving functional equation (26) for µ (Ri) leads to:
µ (Ri) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
[Ri − (Rd + F )]
A
n
c − πµ
n
A
n
c −M
¶
[Ri − (Rd + F )]
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
1
n−1
(30)
µ (R) = 0⇐⇒ [R− (Rd + F )]
A
n
c
= π (31)
µ
¡
R
¢
= 1⇐⇒ π = [x− (Rd + F )]
"
M − (n− 1)
A
n
c
#
(32)
where R ≡ x (by (27)). We then have that the upper bound of the support
R is the monopoly rate x, the lower bound R is the solution to (31), and
the expected profit of each bank i = 1, ...n, is π as given by (32); by (17),
this is strictly positive. Note that distribution µ, R and π are uniquely
determined for a given c. Moreover, both R and π are strictly increasing
in c; that is, the higher the capital requirement, the higher are bank rents.
For any given c, equations (30)− (32) and R = x characterize the Bertrand-
Edgeworth equilibrium for a rectangular demand curve (for the more general
case of a downward-sloping demand curve see Tirole 1988, Chapt.5, and the
references there cited). This is the unique symmetric equilibrium for a given
c (by (30)− (32) and (27)).
(ii) Given that in the competition regime defined by condition (17), each
bank i = 1, ...n randomizes its lending rate according to distribution µ with
support [R , x], the optimal c is:
c∗ = c(R ,Rd) ≡ 1 +
F
(1− p)Rd
− R
Rd
. (33)
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That is, c∗ is the minimum value that satisfies the monitoring incentive
constraint (14). For c = c∗ as given by (33) , the bank with the lowest
lending rate is exactly indiﬀerent between monitoring and not monitoring.
(iii) When inequality (24) holds and c = c∗ as given by (33), then
condition (17) is fulfilled.
Lemma 3 If condition (24) holds, i.e. if aggregate bank capital is neither
scarce nor abundant, then:
c∗ = c(R ,Rd) ≡ 1 +
F
(1− p)Rd
− R
Rd
where, R is the solution to (31) given c = c∗ ≡ c(R ,Rd).
Proof. See Appendix.
For A,n and M that satisfy inequality (24), the optimal capital require-
ment c∗ exceeds the minimum value c, attained when banks collude on the
monopoly rate (when condition (19) holds), and falls below the maximum,
c , attained when competition drives profits to zero (when condition (22)
holds). Furthermore, the lending competition regime is that defined by con-
dition (17): in the symmetric equilibrium each bank i = 1, ...n, randomizes
according to distribution µ with support [R, x], monitors lending, and earns
strictly-positive profit π as given by (32).
Figure 2 illustrates the comparative statics of c∗, with respect to A,M,n
that satisfy inequality (24).
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
For curve C, c = c(R ,Rd); that is, a∗i = m, i = 1, ...n (banks monitor) on
and above curve C. For curve B, [R− (Rd + F )]
A
n
c = [x− (Rd + F )]
∙
M − (n− 1)
A
n
c
¸
;
that is, a bank’s expected profit (conditional upon a∗i = m) at the lower
bound R equals the payoﬀ at any rate in the support, which is π as given by
(32) . The intersection of these curves gives c∗. As AM or n increases, curve
B shifts upwards to B’. Accordingly, c∗ increases as AM or n increases. The
reason is simple: as either AM or n increases, the amount of lending by a
bank when it is undercut by its competitors shrinks, and when it sets its
rate it places more weight on undercutting considerations. This means that
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profit margins, and hence marginal returns to monitoring, decrease. Raising
the capital requirement restores monitoring incentives. The comparison of
optimal capital requirements derived from Lemmas 1-3 confirms that this
result holds for any A,M and n.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium values of banks’ profit margins and opti-
mal capital requirements are inversely related. Social-welfare-maximizing
capital requirements increase when aggregate bank capital and/or the num-
ber of banks increases relative to the aggregate demand for lending. The
(constrained) optimum entails financial intermediation and deviates from
the first best whenever aggregate bank capital is not suﬃciently abundant
(i.e., when condition (22) fails to hold). In this case, banks earn excessive
profits and credit is rationed if inequality (19) is strict.
Proposition 4 summarizes the results in Lemmas 1-3. As the ratio of
aggregate bank capital to the aggregate lending demand, AM , increases, the
economy moves from an equilibrium in which banks make monopoly prof-
its and the capital requirement attains its minimum c (for AM that satisfies
(19), Lemma 1) to one in which profits are strictly positive but below the
monopoly level and the capital requirement is in an intermediate range,
that is c < c∗ < c (for AM that satisfies (24), Lemma 3), and finally to an
equilibrium in which profits are zero and the capital requirement attains
its maximum c (for AM that satisfies (22), Lemma 2). An increase in the
number of banks n, produces similar eﬀects. If aggregate bank capital is
not so scarce as to satisfy condition (19), then as n increases profits fall and
the capital requirement rises (by Lemma 3). Furthermore, as n increases,
condition (22) weakens; therefore the higher the number of banks, the more
likely an equilibrium in which banks lend at the zero profit rate and the cap-
ital requirement attains its maximum c. These results stem from the fact
that AM , n and c jointly determine the intensity of competition and hence
profit margins and monitoring incentives. For any given c, as AM and/or n
increases, the bank’s market power diminishes because its competitors can
serve a greater portion of aggregate demand, banks compete more aggres-
sively, and their profit margins shrink. The marginal return to monitoring
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thus decreases as AM and/or n increases. Raising the capital requirement
restores monitoring incentives.
We therefore conclude that unlike market discipline (Corollary 3), opti-
mal capital requirements make financial intermediation possible. Optimal
capital requirements diminish at the end of a recession, since banks have less
capital as a result of cyclically-induced insolvencies; they are higher when
the banking system is more fragmented, and increase when entry barriers
are removed and competition becomes fiercer.
5 The Predictions of the Model
This section summarizes the predictions of the model with regard to the
endogenous variables: lending rates, return on capital, optimal capital re-
quirement and the probability of a firm’s being denied credit.
Depending on parameter values ( AM , n,Rd, x, F ) there are three possible
regimes: the monopoly, credit-rationing regime (condition 19); the Bertrand-
Edgeworth mixed-strategy regime (condition 24); and the zero-profit per-
fectly competitive regime (condition 22). This is depicted in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3 HERE
where
c ≡ c(R∗, Rd) = 1 +
F
(1− p)Rd
− R
∗
Rd
R∗ ≡ Rd + F
c ≡ c(x,Rd) = 1 +
F
(1− p)Rd
− x
Rd
Exogenous parameter values determine which regime the endogenous
variables belong to and their values within that regime. Figure 4 depicts
the bank lending rate, Ri, as a function of AM for any given (n,Rd, x, F ).
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Similarly, Figure 5 depicts bank profit per unit of capital, πiA
n
; Figure 6 de-
picts the optimal capital requirement, c∗. Figure 7 depicts the probability of
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a firm’s being denied credit, Pr = max
∙
1−
A
c∗
M , 0
¸
, where Ac∗ is the overall
lending volume given aggregate capital A and the optimal capital require-
ment c∗. This probability is strictly positive and decreasing in AM whenever
condition (19) holds and aggregate capital is scarce.
FIGURES 4,5,6,7
ABOUT HERE
An increase in n, number of competing banks, shifts nn−1 c to the left.
The (zero-profit) perfectly competitive regime expands, and within the in-
termediate mixed-strategy regime expected lending rates and expected prof-
its fall and the optimal capital requirement rises (see Figures 4-6, where
n0 > n). A decrease in Rd, the return oﬀered to depositors by the outside
option, leads to an increase in c. This means that the region where banks
earn strictly positive profits expands, leading to an increase in profits and
a decrease in the optimal capital requirement both in the monopoly and in
the intermediate mixed-strategy regime. Moreover, c decreases with Rd, so
that the probability of a firm’s being denied credit when capital is scarce
also decreases accordingly (see Figure 7, where c0 ≡ c(x,R0d) , R0d < Rd).
An increase in project return, x, or a decrease in monitoring cost, F, pro-
duces similar eﬀects, with the exception of lending rates in the monopoly
and mixed-strategy regimes, which increase whenever x increases.
The depositors’ outside option can be realistically posited to be gov-
ernment securities, and hence Rd as determined by monetary policy (as
in Thakor 1996). The model thus predicts that expansive monetary policy
leads to an increase in banks’ profits, lowers firms’ cost of capital and reduces
credit rationing in the capital-crunch regime. Indeed, as Figure 7 shows, a
capital crunch can be cured by recapitalizing banks or by expanding the
money supply. The latter works by reducing banks’ cost of funding and
thereby increasing their incentive-based lending capacity. This immediately
explains the reduction of credit rationing in the capital-scarcity regime. The
reduction in firms’ cost of financing results from the more intense competi-
tion sparked by the increase in lending capacities. Table 1 summarizes the
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model’s comparative statics.
TABLE 1: Comparative Statics
Lending
rate
Profit per
unit of capital
Optimal capital
requirement c∗
Credit
Rationing1
Aggregate
Capitalization: AM ↑
↓ ↓ ↑ ↓
Credit Market
Liberalization : n ↑
↓ ↓ ↑ =
Monetary Policy
Expansion: Rd ↓
↓ ↑ ↓ ↓
Project Profitability:
x ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓
F ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓
1 For AM < c
There is considerable empirical evidence that a scarcity of bank capital
limits lending. The 1989-1992 credit crunch in the US has been relabeled
the ”capital crunch” (see Bernanke and Lown, 1991). Peek and Rosengren
(1997) document that the US branches of Japanese banks cut their lending
because their parents’ capital position had declined. There is also evidence
that regulators are indeed more lenient during banking recession (see Tirole,
1994). Berger, Kyle and Scalise (2000) report episodes of the relaxation of
supervision to alleviate credit shortages. For the insurance industry, Gron
(1994) finds that decreases in aggregate net worth result in higher under-
writing margins, i.e. higher profitability and prices, consistent with the
capacity-constraint hypothesis. Properly testing this model would require
examining the empirical relationship between bank lending profits per unit
of capital and the model parameters ( AM , n,Rd, x, F ) as discussed above,
possibly using regime-switching analysis techniques.
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The foregoing applies to symmetric banks with aggregate capital evenly
distributed. The analysis of asymmetric banks is cumbersome. Our conjec-
ture is that the concentration of capital in a few hands would put upward
pressure on borrowers’ costs, with larger banks setting higher rates with
higher probability than small banks, along the lines of Allen and Hellwig
(1993) for Bertrand-Edgeworth competition between asymmetric duopolists.
An empirical analysis should thus allow for an indicator of bank capital con-
centration.
6 Conclusions
This paper has shown that when variables such as a bank’s profit margin
are not observable to depositors, market discipline may fail to deter banks
from underinvestment in monitoring of borrowers, thereby causing deposi-
tors to withhold funds from banks and making intermediation impossible.
Introducing regulation in the form of capital requirements makes financial
intermediation possible. Moreover, optimal capital requirements are related
to aggregate bank capital and hence to the business cycle, via the link be-
tween recession, insolvencies and bank capital. They also depend on the
degree of concentration of the banking sector and on structural regulation,
e.g. entry barriers. Optimal requirements are higher when entry barriers
are removed and when the banking industry is more fragmented; that is,
optimal requirements depend on the intensity of competition. The outcome
of banking competition departs from the perfect-competitive result in that
banks earn excessive profits and credit may be rationed. This is true in an
optimally regulated economy (by Proposition 4) and it is true a fortiori in
an unregulated economy in which a bank’s lending volume would be further
limited by its capital. These results suggest that delegated monitoring in an
environment of aggregate risk is suﬃcient for interbank competition to be
imperfect and may account for the cyclical behavior of banks’ profit margins
and of the cost of financing to borrowers. The results also explain regula-
tors’ leniency during recessions and the increased focus on capital adequacy
rules following credit market liberalization in the US and Europe. They also
suggest that the ongoing consolidation of the banking sector should lead to
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lower capital requirements.
The analysis also suggests a novel channel for monetary policy. Expan-
sive policy aﬀects the credit market equilibrium by reducing banks’ cost of
funding and thereby increasing their incentive-based lending capacity. Bor-
rowers’ cost of financing diminishes as a result of the consequently sharper
competition in lending. Yet interbank competition is imperfect, so banks’
profit margins increase because the reduction in their funding cost is not
fully passed on to borrowers. Thanks to higher profit margins, the opti-
mal capital requirement falls. Monetary policy can thus substitute for or
complement recapitalization of banks to alleviate credit shortages.
What drives these results is the conflict of interests between the bank’s
shareholders, insiders, and depositors. These agency problems set an upper
bound on the amount of loans that bank insiders find optimal to monitor.
We call this upper bound the bank’s incentive-based lending capacity, and
it is positively linked to its (endogenous) profit margin and (inside) capital.
Capital requirements function by eﬀectively restricting the bank’s scale of
business not to exceed this upper bound. This makes the analysis especially
relevant to institutional environments in which the protection of depositors
and outside shareholders is limited. But even in more developed environ-
ments with functioning financial markets, capital appears costly to raise (see
Smith 1986 for a survey of the evidence) and the equity value of the banking
sector aﬀects lending (see Sharpe 1995). Bank capital will then still con-
strain the bank’s scale of business, and capital requirements ought to be set
so as to align the latter to that compatible with its monitoring incentives
(i.e. the capital requirements derived in Proposition 4).
The paper has assumed away deposit insurance. Clearly, an optimal in-
surance scheme would contemplate the capital requirements derived here.
Failure in prudential regulation, coupled with depositors’ and/or sharehold-
ers’ protection, either explicit or implicit, would imply no eﬀective constraint
on the bank’s loanable funds. Banks would find it optimal to choose scales
of business greater than that compatible with sound and prudent manage-
ment. This does not necessarily imply bank failures. Indeed, banks will be
solvent in the lucky event that macro-economic conditions support firms’
performance, i.e., when the state realization is θ . Interpreting θ as a price-
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bubble state and θ as a burst bubble allows us to explain the recent Asian
experience.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose to the contrary that in an equilibrium i does not monitor. Then
i’s expected lending revenue would be pRiLi, which (by Ri ≤ x and as-
sumption A1) falls below the opportunity cost of invested resources RdLi .
Depositors and/or the bank would suﬀer expected losses, thus violating the
condition that at equilibrium agents’ participation constraints are necessar-
ily satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 1
When condition (19) holds and c = c ≡ c(x,Rd), then condition (15) is
satisfied: no matter what rates i’s competitors oﬀer, i’s lending volume is
constrained by the regulatory ceiling
A
n
c , and the equilibrium strategy of
each bank i = 1, ...n is therefore Ri = x; the minimum value of the capital
requirement, c = c(x,Rd), then satisfies the incentive constraint (14) , and
hence solves the regulator’s optimization problem.
Proof of Lemma 2
If condition (22) holds, then c = c ≡ c(R∗, Rd) satisfies inequality (16):
the equilibrium strategy of each bank i = 1, ...n is Ri = R∗ (which implies
that the incentive constraint (14) is met). This is true because i cannot be
better oﬀ at Ri > R∗, as by (16) in this case it would lend nothing and
would be worse oﬀ at Ri < R∗. The capital requirement would be binding,
i.e. Li =
A
n
c ≡ Lc
¡
R∗, Rd; An
¢
, and profits would be lower than at R∗.
Proof of Lemma 3
From observation (iii) above, we have that when inequality (24) holds
and c = c(R ,Rd), then the competition regime is that defined by condition
(17); (ii) has established that if under condition (17) banks randomize their
lending rates according to distribution µ with support [R , x], then c =
c(R,Rd) is optimal. It remains to be proved that when condition (17) holds,
the equilibrium of competition in lending is indeed one in which each bank
randomizes its lending rate according to distribution µ with support [R , x].
This is true because: i) x is the monopoly rate on the residual demand
left to a bank when all the rivals undercut its rate; ii) given that bank i’s
competitors use this strategy, its expected profit for any Ri ∈ [R , x] attain
the maximum value π, by (26). Thus i cannot be better oﬀ by randomizing
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with a diﬀerent distribution with support [R , x], and it would be worse oﬀ
by setting a rate lower than R . At Ri < R , i’s lending volume would be the
same as at R ; that is, its lending volume would still be constrained by the
lending ceiling
A
n
c , so that its expected profit would be strictly lower than
at R and hence lower than π. Since by (30) − (32), µ, R , π are uniquely
determined, the equilibrium derived is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
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Footnotes
1Capital requirements may be costly, though. This has been shown by
Besanko and Kanatas (1996) for a bank whose total assets are given and
capital requirements dictate the financing mix between debt —deposits— and
outside equity. The costs of capital requirements are the agency costs of
outside equity a la Jensen and Meckling (1976). Moreover, capital is costly
because of the liquidity costs of equity versus demand deposits (Gorton and
Winton 1995).
2 Keeley (1990) finds a direct relationship between the US reforms that
increased competition and the increase in the number of bank failures in the
1980s.
3 Following Hellwig (1991), Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Dewa-
tripont and Tirole (1994) and Freixas and Rochet (1997), we interpret
“monitoring” broadly. It can consist of: i) screening projects in an adverse-
selection environment (as in Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984, Broecker 1990);
or ii) preventing opportunistic behaviour by the borrower during the real-
ization of the project (as in Diamond 1991, Holmstrom and Tirole 1997).
4We thus explicitly model monitoring institutions as intermediaries that
compete in prices for loans and deposits. This is in contrast to Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997), where monitoring institutions are price takers, in that
the rate of return on capital is determined by market clearing.
5 Indeed, with uncorrelated project returns, the larger the number of
loans, the more diversified the credit portfolio, the lower the probability of
default and the lower auditing costs; for a fully diversified bank, the costs
are nil.
6 Monitoring may also consist in testing of an entrepreneur’s credit wor-
thiness (at a cost) in an adverse-selection environment where a given per-
centage of the entrepreneur population have type g projects and the rest
type b projects, and the test result is a success or a failure depending on
project type. In this case, F is the cost of performing a test, divided by the
probability of an entrepreneur’s being endowed with a type g project.
7 Arguably, a bank could monitor only part of its loans. However, such
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a strategy is strictly dominated either by monitoring all loans or none. This
will be clarified in Section 3 (see footnote 9).
8 Since the bank’s action is unobservable, its timing is irrelevant; thus
a game in which the bank makes its monitoring choice (contingent on its
lending and borrowing rates and lending volume) at the outset is perfectly
equivalent to the one defined here.
9 We can now see why monitoring a fraction 0 < λ < 1 of the loan
portfolio is a strictly dominated strategy. If the bank chooses 0 < λ < 1 is
insolvent in θ, then it would be better oﬀ by choosing λ = 0, i.e. ai = ∅,
thus avoiding monitoring costs altogether; by contrast, if it is solvent, then
it suﬀers all the consequences of financing (1− λ)Li projects with negative
net present value, so it would be better oﬀ choosing λ = 1, i.e. ai = m.
10 With T periods, the bank maximizes expected discounted profits, and
with T −→∞, it chooses strategies corresponding to the infinitely-repeated
static Nash equilibrium. It chooses monitoring if:
π(Ri, Li|a∗i = m)
µ
1
1− δ
¶
≥ π(Ri, Li|a∗i = ∅)
µ
1
1− δp
¶
where δ is the discount factor. The monitoring-incentive compatibility con-
dition (8) becomes:
A
n
Li
≥ c(Ri, Rd; δ)
where c(Ri, Rd; δ) is the minimum incentive-based capital requirement for a
T -period horizon:
c(Ri, Rd; δ) =
µ
1
1− δ
¶½
1 +
F (1− δp)
(1− p)Rd
− Ri
Rd
¾
This is less than c (Ri, Rd) whenever δ > 0 — i.e. future profits have positive
weights in the bank’s objective function. However, this paper’s results also
carry over to the multiperiod environment whenever 0 ≤ δ < 1, i.e. future
profits are weighted less than current profits.
11 We have not considered the trivial case in which bank capital is so
great that the bank’s incentive constraint is never binding, i.e. Lc
¡
R∗, Rd; An
¢
≥
M and each bank i = 1, ...n, monitors regardless of its amount of loanable
funds.
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12 This would be the case if undertaking a project required entrepreneur-
ial eﬀort and its (non-pecuniary) cost diﬀered across entrepreneurs according
to some distribution function over the total measure of firms — entrepreneurs.
13 Note that, for a given n, and, AM , as c decreases the lending com-
petition regime shifts from monopoly — for c that satisfies inequality (15)
— to the Bertrand-Edgeworth regime — for c that satisfies inequality (17) —
and from this to the perfectly competitive (zero-profit) regime — for c that
satisfies inequality (16). Thus minimizing the capital requirement subject
to monitoring-incentive constraint (14), does indeed amount to minimizing
bank rents, subject to banks’ finding it incentive-compatible to monitor.
14 In the intermediate range, that is when c < AM < c
³
n
n−1
´
, banks
randomize lending rates (by Lemma 3); Ri on the vertical axis should be
interpreted as expected lending rate.
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